The message behind the deployment of PLA Navy Task Force 107.
Explanation
With the larger scheme of military exercises, it was almost reduced. However, China’s Task Force 107 was forced to divert 49 commercial aircraft from its flight route, with only three ships being strong. This is mainly due to sudden warnings issued with international security frequency a few hours before the shooting begins. More importantly, this exercise should be viewed in the overall context and as a strategic message of Beijing’s political warfare work in the Southwest Pacific.
Political wars and strategic signals constitute important elements in China’s military operations.
Unlike the former Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursues a long game in which military forces support rather than support in peacetime and crises. Beijing has long criticised Western naval operations in the waters that it considers itself, demonstrating that if it chooses to do so, it could do the same for its American allies.
Furthermore, separating the enemy from existing potential allies has been a long-standing Chinese strategic principle and is best known in the West from Sun Tzu’s widely read art of war. China’s 30 years of aid, trade, diplomacy, and security efforts to plead for countries in the Southwest Pacific Islands from the West have begun to pay off.
Currently visiting Siem Reap in Cambodia, the Small Three-row Task Group 107 of the People Liberation Army Navy (Planning) caused short gusts of headlines across Asia by performing a live fire exercise of less than two hours in the Tasman Sea four weeks ago.
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Task Force 107 did not visit ports or interact with these countries in this deployment, but the future task force would do both, giving the possibility of pressure even if Beijing did not destroy the critical air and sea links connecting Australia, New Zealand and the United States.
Beyond that, the Australian neighborhood of the task force added another potential benefit to Beijing, and harbored doubts in Canberra about the effectiveness of its alliance with the US. The task force may have come from China, but its development highlights that the PRC is much closer to Australia than the US.
Australian sympathizers in Beijing argued that it would be economically clever to respond to Beijing rather than risking export access to the Chinese market by launching costly and time-consuming military efforts that could anger Chinese leaders.
These debates quickly faded and replaced by a growing commitment to revamp Australia’s military, but seeds are planted. Through trade opportunities and “finance grants,” China seeks to nurture political themes “to work with Beijing” for months and years to come, for those willing to support those themes. Creating divisions between enemy body politics and causing chaos in enemy capitals is another axiom of traditional Chinese strategic thinking.
Skeptics may disregard or reject the interpretation of Beijing’s intentions and argue that there is no reason for concern. After all, the forces were small and did not violate international law or UN Sea law treaties or take threatening actions.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that another task group will follow immediately. Finally, “anti-security guards” note that the plan has not yet deployed aircraft carriers in the far ocean, and it may take years before this can be done.
Although practically accurate, these assessments ignore three very important factors in maritime forces and strategy. First, it takes three to ten years to build a warship, and more than ten years to build or rebuild a fleet. The United States and other major Western countries have ignored or mistakenly replaced maritime resources over the past 25 years, but the PRC has built and modernized fleets at a historically unprecedented pace.
The PLA Navy’s latest warships are technically dressed with the best US Navy surface sailors, twice as many constructions a year. American submarine and aircraft carriers remain excellent, but PRC is catching up again, expanding numbers at a faster rate.
Furthermore, the Navy has diplomatic and political and economic roles during peacetime. Numbers are one of the important roles. Called the Show-the-Flag mission, warships pass through the area, and port visits to foreign countries show the country’s interest in the area.
As some naval leaders and national strategists have long said, there is no substitute for existence in showing national interests. While only permanent military garrisons provide stronger statements, regular naval visits provide a cost-effective alternative if they are practical and complementary in countries that already host military presences.
Royal Australian Navy seafarers of HMAS Arunta are monitoring the Liberation Army of the Tasman Sea (PLA-N) Fujino refill container weishanhu and the Eda-class frigate Henyan. Courtesy of the Australian Department of Defense
Finally, port visits inject significant cash flow into the local economy through crew tourism activities and the purchase of food, fuel and other consumables by the vessel. Economic contributions and civic projects that the crew may take on could win a lot of goodwill.
As mentioned above, task group 107 did not carry out calls to ports in the Southwest Pacific or South China Sea. The next task group expansion includes a visit to the Solomon Islands and the Cook Islands, and possibly Fiji. Three countries that Beijing recently signed security or economic agreements, respectively.
Furthermore, these three countries have been in waters that have been significantly decreasing over the past 30 years with presence in the US, Australia and New Zealand, economic investment and diplomatic attention. Interestingly, the PLA Navy currently has far more numbers to do this kind of deployment than its US counterparts.
In naval terminology, Beijing fired political shots across the defense plan bows of Australia, the Philippines and possibly New Zealand. Task Force 107’s operations in the Tasman Sea are certainly very small, but that may not be in ten years. The incident is merely a preface to the stories that come in the Southwest Pacific and elsewhere.
So, this is the latest message that Beijing has sent using the PLA Navy, especially over the past four years. I hope someone is reading them and preparing a response.
The views expressed in this article are the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the epoch era.
